Case: Pottinger v. City of Miami
1:88-cv-02406 | U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
Filed Date: Dec. 23, 1988
Closed Date: Oct. 1, 2020
Clearinghouse coding complete
Case Summary
This case partially predates PACER. Therefore, access to documents related to this case is limited.
On 12/23/1988, the plaintiff, as representative of a class of homeless persons, filed this § 1983 lawsuit against the City of Miami in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the City’s police department had “a custom, practice and policy of arresting, harassing and otherwise interfering with homeless people for engaging in basic activities of daily life . . . in the public places where they are forced to live.” The plaintiffs asked the Court for an injunction against the City to prohibit its police from arresting homeless persons who engaged in “life-sustaining conduct” in public, and from seizing and destroying their property. The district court found the City liable and granted the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. 810 F.Supp. 1551.
The City appealed, challenging the basis and scope of the injunction. In December of 1994, following oral argument, the case was remanded to allow the district court to “issue appropriate clarifying language to guide the [C]ity in its determination of the scope of its duties under the injunction, and [to] consider whether its injunction should be modified in light of . . . events [that transpired subsequent to its order granting the injunction].” 40 F.3d 1155. On remand, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the injunction would remain in effect because the circumstances had not changed significantly.
The City appealed again, and oral arguments were heard in January of 1996. The court instructed the parties to try to settle their dispute. After negotiating for nearly two years, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which the district court subsequently approved.
Under the settlement agreement, the City agreed to implement various forms of training for its law enforcement officers in order to sensitize them to the unique struggle and circumstances of homeless persons. The agreement outlined three options for enhanced training procedures: (A) training and education provided at the School of Justice and Safety Administration at Miami Dade Community College; (B) post-Academy training; and (C) in-service training. The City was required to adopt in-service training, and had to choose between options (A) and (B).
In addition to improved training procedures, the City was required to adopt a Departmental Order regarding the treatment of homeless individuals and the City's commitment to respect the rights of homeless people. This order implemented the protocol that law enforcement officers had to follow when encountering homeless individuals. Pursuant to the new law enforcement protocol, police officers were forbidden from arresting or detaining homeless people not engaged in criminal activity. Police could only approach a homeless person to advise him or her of shelter, services, or available assistance. If a homeless person was reasonably believed to be mentally ill, law enforcement could take the person to a receiving facility for involuntary examination.
Further, if law enforcement observed a homeless person engaging in life-sustaining conduct misdemeanors—including activities such as eating, sleeping, sitting, congregating, or walking in public—they could warn the homeless person to stop the conduct and alert them to available shelter. If the homeless person accepted the available shelter, the police officer could not make an arrest and instead, had to make arrangements to transport the individual to the shelter. However, if no shelter was available, no warning could be given nor arrest made. If law enforcement observed a homeless person engaging in non-life sustaining conduct misdemeanors, they could warn the homeless person to stop the unlawful conduct, or if deemed appropriate, detain or arrest the person. Similarly, if law enforcement observed a homeless person committing a felony, they could detain or arrest that person. Finally, the agreement required that law enforcement respect the personal property of all homeless individuals and forbid the destruction of personal property.
Additionally, the settlement agreement required that the City adopt a procedure for monitoring and accounting for its officers' encounters with homeless persons. It also called for the creation of an Advisory Committee to monitor law enforcement contact with homeless persons.
In October of 2000, the parties filed a joint motion to modify the settlement agreement. The agreement had established a $600,000 “Start Off Fund” in order to compensate qualified class members. The payments were to be made within two years. But since they started later than expected, the parties asked the district court to modify the agreement to allow payments to continue until the fund was exhausted. The district court did as the parties requested. No one sought attorneys’ fees for the work performed during the 2000 modification process.
In September of 2013, the City filed a motion to modify the agreement. According to the City, the improvements in programs and services did not ameliorate problems for two subgroups of the homeless population—"the chronically homeless and sexual predators." The plaintiffs' attorney filed a response opposing the motion, arguing that, in effect, the City was attempting to terminate the settlement agreement as to the “chronically homeless” and registered sex offenders. In October of 2013, the district court held a hearing on the City’s motion for modification and suggested that the parties mediate their dispute.
In the 2014 addendum approved by the district court, the parties agreed to some of the modifications proposed by the City. The major changes were: (1) that registered sex offenders or sexual predators under certain Florida statutes were no longer afforded some of the protections provided by the original settlement agreement; (2) a facility was considered a shelter if it could accommodate the homeless for a minimum of 24 hours and had mats at least three inches thick for the homeless to sleep on; (3) starting a fire in a park no longer constituted “life-sustaining conduct;” and (4) arrests could now be made for “life-sustaining conduct” misdemeanors after a warning even if a shelter was available, but only if the conduct involved “imminent threat of physical injury.” The City's requested modifications concerning the chronically homeless did not become part of the 2014 addendum.
Following the addendum, the plaintiffs' attorney moved for $476,094.55 in attorneys’ fees for the work performed by counsel during the modification process. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the settlement agreement permitted attorneys’ fees for enforcing the agreement, but not for opposing modifications to the agreement. In addition, the district court found that the plaintiffs were not the prevailing party as to the City’s motion. 2014 WL 2890061.
The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling on the grounds that the language in the parties' settlement agreement was clear with regards to attorneys' fees not being available for the modifications of contracts. 805 F.3d 1293.
For more than two years, the parties operated under the consent decree without any need for court enforcement. In April and May of 2018, the parties attended two mediation conferences. However, the parties were unable to reach an agreement. On May 30, 2018, the City filed a motion to terminate, or in the alternative modify, the consent decree. The City argued that its treatment of homeless individuals was fundamentally different from what it was when the litigation began in 1988. The City noted that it had significantly increased the number and scope of programs and services to assist the homeless community and had overhauled its police practices concerning interaction with homeless individuals and disposition of their belongings.
In response to the City's motion to terminate the consent decree, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the consent decree and hold the City in contempt. The plaintiffs argued that, starting in late 2017, the City had been systematically violating the consent decree by seizing and destroying the plaintiffs' property, banishing the plaintiffs from certain areas of the City, and arresting them for "life sustaining misdemeanor conduct" without offering shelter or assistance as required by the consent decree. Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged that the City had reverted back to its actions and conduct that precipitated the lawsuit. They included nearly two dozen declarations from homeless individuals who had been subjected to these police practices.
After holding a status conference, District Judge Federico A. Moreno called for an evidentiary hearing on the new allegations. The hearing was held on September 24–26, October 24 and 25, and November 1, 2018. The court issued its memorandum opinion on February 15, 2019. The court found that the defendant had been substantially compliant with the consent decree and terminated the agreement. By the same reasoning, the court denied the motion to hold the defendant in contempt. 359 F.Supp.3d 1177.
A month later, the plaintiffs appealed to the 11th Circuit. On appeal they argued that the district court misinterpreted several aspects of the consent decree itself, by misplacing the burden of proof onto the plaintiffs, and by ignoring an alleged pattern of violating the consent decree.
On October 1, 2020, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision not to hold the city in contempt and to terminate the consent decree because the district court interpreted the consent decree correctly and did not abuse its discretion in the termination. Plaintiffs argued that the district court misinterpreted multiple terms in the agreement in order to hold the city compliant, including when police officers were allowed to discard plaintiffs’ belongings and if police must give a contemporaneous warning before arresting a person for a violation, but the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court interpreted the plain meaning of the terms in the Consent Decree correctly. The Eleventh Circuit also held that the district court properly terminated the Consent Decree because the city was in “substantial compliance” by implementing programs to stop the criminalization of homelessness. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not holding the city in contempt because plaintiffs did not establish unambiguous violations by clear and convincing evidence. 977 F.3d 1061.
After the decision in the Eleventh Circuit, there has been no further litigation in the case, and it has been closed.
Summary Authors
Daniel Fryer (4/17/2016)
Eva Richardson (11/23/2018)
Jack Hibbard (8/19/2020)
Sophia Weaver (4/6/2023)
People
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/5681760/parties/pottinger-v-city-of-miami/
Atkins, Carl Clyde (Florida)
Abudu, Nancy G (Florida)
Andrews, Forrest Lee (Florida)
Bittner, Warren (Florida)
Bru, Julie O. (Florida)
Documents in the Clearinghouse
Docket
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/5681760/pottinger-v-city-of-miami/
Last updated March 31, 2026, 4:51 a.m.
Case Details
State / Territory:
Case Type(s):
Key Dates
Filing Date: Dec. 23, 1988
Closing Date: Oct. 1, 2020
Case Ongoing: No
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
Group of homeless individuals
Plaintiff Type(s):
Attorney Organizations:
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: Yes
Class Action Outcome: Granted
Defendants
City
City of Miami
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Constitutional Clause(s):
Unreasonable search and seizure
Other Dockets:
Southern District of Florida 1:88-cv-02406
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 91-05316
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 92-05145
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 95-04555
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 14-13287
Southern District of Florida 19-10957
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff OR Mixed
Relief Granted:
Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement
Source of Relief:
Form of Settlement:
Court Approved Settlement or Consent Decree
Content of Injunction:
Amount Defendant Pays: $600,000
Order Duration: 1998 - 2020
Issues
General/Misc.:
Discrimination Area:
Jails, Prisons, Detention Centers, and Other Institutions:
Over/Unlawful Detention (facilities)
Policing:
Reproductive rights:
Case Summary of Pottinger v. City of Miami, Civil Rights Litig. Clearinghouse, http://www.dev.clearinghouse.net/case/15150/ (last updated 4/6/2023).