Case: Edgar v. Coats
8:19-cv-00985 | U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
Filed Date: April 2, 2019
Case Ongoing
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Case Summary
This case is about the government’s prepublication review (PPR) regime which exposed intelligence-agency employees and military personnel to possible sanction if they wrote or spoke about their government service without first obtaining the government’s approval. On April 2, 2019, five former employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and Knight First Amendment Institute, sued the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the CIA, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the NSA. The plaintiffs argued that the policy, which granted executive officers sweeping discretion to suppress publications and speech, violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin defendants from continuing to enforce the prepublication review regimes against the plaintiffs or any other person. The case was assigned to Judge George Jarrod Hazel.
In their complaint, plaintiffs recognized that the agencies had a legitimate government interest in protecting bona fide national security secrets but argued that prior restraint was an extreme measure justifiable only in circumstances involving a compelling government interest, where procedural safeguards against censorship would be necessary. They alleged that the PPR regime restrained more far more speech than could be justified by any legitimate government interest. They also argued that the policy should be void for vagueness under the First and Fifth Amendments because it failed to provide former government employees with fair notice of what they must submit for prepublication review and of what they can and cannot publish. This vagueness invited arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the prepublication review, especially for speech criticizing intelligence agencies and their practices.
Discovery continued until April 16, 2020, when Judge Hazel granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Judge Hazel rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had failed to identify any future concrete harm that they were likely to encounter because of the deficiencies they claimed exist in the PPR regimes. He agreed with the plaintiffs that the defendants’ PPR regimes had a chilling effect on protected speech, finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that they themselves had been deterred from exercising their First Amendment rights. But Judge Hazel did not agree with the plaintiffs’ theory that they were subject to government licensing schemes that invest executive officers with overly broad discretion, which by itself confers standing; he asserted that the PPR regime as described by the plaintiffs could not be understood as a licensing scheme. Judge Hazel then addressed the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ claims were unripe; the defendants asserted that the plaintiffs were challenging how the PPR regime might operate in the future rather than opposing any current prepublication review decision. However, Judge Hazel rejected the defendants’ argument because the ripeness standard is loosened in First Amendment cases, so the plaintiffs’ claims were ripe for adjudication because they were being subjected to PPR regimes that they reasonably alleged required them to self-censor.
Judge Hazel next turned to address the merits of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims. First, he rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the PPR regime was unconstitutional prior restraint because the Supreme Court has already decided that a prepublication review requirement imposed on a government employee with access to classified information is not an unconstitutional prior restraint. Next, Judge Hazel agreed with the defendants that the PPR regimes were reasonable measures to protect the government’s compelling interest in protecting sensitive information and thereby did not violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Finally, he held that the regimes were not unduly vague under the First and Fifth Amendments because they adequately informed authors of the types of materials they must submit and established the kinds of information that could be redacted. Judge Hazel granted the motion to dismiss. 454 F.Supp.3d 502.
In light of that ruling, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on May 12, 2020 (No. 20-1568). On June 23, 2021, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit, consisting of Judges Paul V. Niemeyer, Barbara Milano Keenan, and William B. Traxler, Jr., affirmed the district court’s ruling granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Their reasoning mirrored the district court; they agreed that although the plaintiffs did have standing and their claims were ripe, their claims were likely to fail on the merits. The circuit court particularly took issue with the fact that the plaintiffs were facially challenging the PPR regimes, that is as they applied generally rather than to the plaintiffs’ specific situations. They asserted that facial challenges like this are typically disfavored. The circuit court applied the test for facial challenges and determined, as the district court had, that the defendants’ PPR regimes were reasonable means of serving the government’s compelling interest in keeping classified or otherwise sensitive information secret, and therefore did not violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. 2 F.4th 298.
The plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on November 29, 2021. That petition is pending as of March 22, 2021, and the case is ongoing.
Summary Authors
Hafsa Tout (10/24/2019)
Devon Schmidt (2/25/2022)
People
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/14855739/parties/edgar-v-coats/
Abdo, Alex (New York)
Abdo, Alexander Abraham (Maryland)
Eidelman, Vera (New York)
Byron, H. Thomas (Maryland)
Brown, Bruce D. (Maryland)
Documents in the Clearinghouse
Resources
Docket
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/14855739/edgar-v-coats/
Last updated April 1, 2026, 5:24 a.m.
Case Details
State / Territory:
Case Type(s):
Special Collection(s):
Key Dates
Filing Date: April 2, 2019
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
Former employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense
Plaintiff Type(s):
Attorney Organizations:
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
Federal
Acting Secretary of Defense
Director of National Intelligence
Director of National Intelligence
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
Director of the CIA
Director of the National Security Agency
Director of the NSA
Secretary of Defense
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
Ex Parte Young (Federal) or Bivens
Constitutional Clause(s):
Other Dockets:
District of Maryland 8:19-cv-00985
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 20-01568
Available Documents:
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Defendant
Relief Granted:
Source of Relief:
Issues
General/Misc.:
Case Summary of Edgar v. Coats, Civil Rights Litig. Clearinghouse, http://www.dev.clearinghouse.net/case/17166/ (last updated 2/25/2022).