Case: Garza v. Vera
7:18-cv-00046 | U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Filed Date: Feb. 21, 2018
Closed Date: May 12, 2021
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Case Summary
This is a case about the constitutionality of electioneering and property use policies adopted by Starr County, Texas.
On January 8, 2018, Starr County adopted an order (the “County Order”) banning electioneering on all property owned by, or under the control of, the County. After the County failed to address multiple requests for clarifications on the meaning and practical implementation of the County Order, on February 21, 2018, two politically active Starr County residents filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against Starr County, the Commissioners of Starr County, the District Attorney and County Attorney for Starr County and the Sheriff for Starr County. The plaintiffs claimed that the County Order violated their right to engage in electioneering, a form of political speech protected under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Texas Election Code. Represented by attorneys from the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the Texas Civil Rights Project, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees. The following day, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to enjoin the County and its employees from implementing or enforcing the County Order. The defendants submitted a brief in response to the TRO application and argued that the Order at issue was superseded by a new policy of Starr County enacted on February 12, 2018 (the “February Use Policy”), which established regulations on how the defendant's property may be used and forbid improper uses.
The court held a hearing on February 26, 2018 on plaintiffs’ application for emergency relief and made a preliminary ruling that the County Order was unconstitutionally vague and invalid and announced it would issue an order on the TRO application within the next day.
On February 28, 2018, the court issued a written decision granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs’ TRO application. 309 F. Supp. 3d 454. The court found that the February Use Policy controlled over the original County Order and was the subject of plaintiffs’ application for TRO. The court also determined that the plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on the merits of their claim that provisions of the February Use Policy regulating use of County parking lots violated the First Amendment since the restrictions were likely reasonable in light of the County’s concerns. However, the court found that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their claim that provisions of the February Use Policy that required a permit for use of any “common areas” of County property violated the First Amendment. The court temporarily enjoined implementation and enforcement of such section of the February Use Policy until the merits of the case were decided.
Throughout March and April 2018, the defendants adopted amended County property use policies and, on May 9, 2018, the County also adopted new supplemental electioneering regulations (the “Electioneering Regulations”), which (i) prohibited all speech and assembly on county property, including on sidewalks and in grassy areas, during County holidays, (ii) imposed a permit application process for use of six (6) identified County properties, and (iii) prohibited electioneering on areas in county property such as sidewalks, lawns, and grassy areas that are outside the 100-foot perimeter area where electioneering activities are restricted under the Texas Election Code. During this time period, the plaintiffs filed amended complaints alleging that the revised use policies and the Electioneering Regulations were unconstitutional and illegal restraints on speech, unconstitutionally overbroad, and not reasonable time, place and manner regulations.
On May 21, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second application for a TRO order to enjoin the County and its employees from implementing or enforcing the revised use policies restricting plaintiffs’ right to speak and assemble peaceably on County property, including on the upcoming Memorial Day holiday. The defendants’ responded that it would not prohibit public gatherings honoring veterans at any County cemetery, memorial or park on Memorial Day. On May 25, 2018, the court issued an order on limited issue. The court did not rule on the merits of plaintiffs’ request for a second TRO but, given the defendants’ agreement not to restrict gatherings on Memorial Day, ordered that public gatherings honoring veterans at any County cemetery, memorial, or park be permitted on May 28, 2018 (Memorial Day).
On June 5, 2018, the court held a hearing on plaintiffs’ second application for emergency relief. The defendants agreed to enact further changes to the use policies and Electioneering Regulations. As a result, the court denied the plaintiff’s second TRO application and allowed the defendants 30 days to enact such changes. The plaintiffs were allowed 30 days thereafter in which to further amend its complaint to specifically identify the provisions to which plaintiffs object and the relief requested.
On June 25, 2018, the defendants adopted a further revised Building and Property Use Policy (the “June 25 Policy”) and further revised electioneering regulations (the “June 25 Electioneering Regulations”). The plaintiffs filed their fourth amended complaint on July 25, 2018 arguing that the June 25 Policy and June 25 Electioneering Regulations violated the First Amendment and were unconstitutionally overbroad, vague and not a reasonable time, place and manner regulation of speech. In particular, the plaintiffs argued that the latest revised polices imposed a burdensome permit application process on residents who sought to use the six (6) named County buildings and facilities, including surrounding greens and lawns, and prohibited use of the County properties on County holidays. The permit application process required that an applicant be at least 21 years of age; pay an application deposit; apply at least 30 days in advance of the planned date to speak or assemble at the identified County properties; sign a release of liability; have the applicant’s signature notarized by a Texas notary public; pay after-hours fees of $25 per hour; and pay a $50 deposit that “may” be refunded at the discretion of the County. To use the County Courthouse or lawns, an additional deposit of up to $1,000 could be imposed at the discretion of the County judge. The plaintiffs also argued that the June 25 Electioneering Regulations violated the Texas Election Code because electioneering, but no other type of speech or assembly, was prohibited on County lawns and grassy areas outside the 100-foot zone where electioneering activities may be restricted under the Texas Election Code and imposed criminal penalties to those who violate the regulations.
On August 14, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On August 16, 2018, the plaintiffs sought leave to file a fifth amended complaint to add a new plaintiff to the lawsuit – a Starr County resident under the age of 21 running for office in the November 2018 election. On August 23, 2018, the court issued an order granting the plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for leave to amend its complaint and denying defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot. The plaintiffs filed their fifth (and final) amended complaint on August 23, 2018 alleging that the June 25 Policy and June 25 Electioneering Regulations: (i) abridged plaintiffs’ free speech rights and right to assemble peaceably as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; (ii) violated the Equal Protection clause of U.S. Constitution because the policies infringed on the right of persons under the age of 21 to peaceably speak and assemble; (iii) violated Section 61.003 of the Texas Election Code; and (iv) constituted acts outside the authority of the defendant government officials. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees.
On September 10, 2018, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and argued they had a compelling interest in protecting County property and safe, unimpeded voter access to polling locations. The defendants maintained that the policies adopted by the County were permissible regulations designed for the safety of pedestrians in parking areas, to allow County buildings to be used for their primary and intended purpose and to maintain County property free from blight and nuisance. The plaintiffs opposed the defendants' motion and filed a cross motion for judgment on the pleadings on October 1, 2018. Each party submitted briefs on the motions over the next several months. On February 5, 2019, the court issued an order denying the parties’ cross motions for judgment on the pleadings and found that the plaintiffs’ claims turned on facts outside the pleadings, namely defendants’ proffered justifications for certain provisions of the policies and regulations challenged by the plaintiffs. As such, the court determined the claims were better suited for disposition through summary judgment.
On March 29, 2019, both parties filed their respective motions for summary judgment. Briefing continued and the plaintiffs argued that the County had political motivations for enacting the policies since they singled out certain polling places where incumbents were most likely to be challenged in upcoming elections. The plaintiffs also argued that the County’s regulations prohibiting election activities that “distract” drivers were unconstitutional restrictions of political speech but no other types of speech. The defendants argued that its policies were not enacted for an unlawful purpose but were justified for many reasons, including to protect County property, protect voters from harassment and intimidation by people engaged in electioneering and to ensure adequate parking at polling locations.
On October 17, 2019, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court found that (i) the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their challenges to the driver distraction provision of the June 25 Electioneering Regulations and the permitting process, age restriction and criminal penalty provisions of the June 25 Use Policy; (ii) the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ remaining challenges to the June 25 Use Policy; and (iii) in all other respects, both motions were denied.
The court applied strict scrutiny to the June 25 Electioneering Regulations and found that the driver distraction provision of Section 4(l) in June 25 Electioneering Regulations was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague; however, plaintiffs’ other constitutional challenges to the electioneering regulations were denied.
With respect to the equal protection challenge to the June 25 Use Policy, the court found that the defendants did not provide a compelling justification or interest to support the age restriction contained within the permitting process and, given the heightened standard of review that applies when an age classification implicates protected speech, the age restriction violated equal protection.
With respect to the First Amendment challenges to the June 25 Use Policy, the court found that the ban on use of identified County property on holidays met intermediate scrutiny and the reasonableness standard. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court also found that plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment on their facial challenge to the permitting requirement since other public spaces remain available, without a permit, for expressive activities. However, the court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their facial challenge to the permitting process, and that burdensome application process and deposit and after-hour fees requirements set forth in sections 6(a)-(c) and 8(b) and (e) of the June 25 Use Policy constituted an overbroad, prior restraint on speech in violation of the First Amendment. The court further found that plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their facial vagueness challenge to the criminal penalty imposed by the June 25 Use Policy since there is potential for arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of that section.
The court granted an injunction against enforcement of the driver distraction provision of the June 25 Electioneering Regulation. The court also granted an injunction (i) against the portion of the June 25 Use Policy that allowed the County “to prosecute any and all violators to the fullest extent of the law”, and left the County with the ability to “have persons violating any provisions removed from the premises,” and (2) against the permitting process requirement pending amendment by the County of the objectionable process. The court left the County with the ability to enforce the otherwise unobjectionable portions of June 25 Use Policy.
The court further found that the record reflected a genuine dispute as to whether electioneering activities created or threatened to create what the defendants characterized as a “circus” at polling locations or whether, as plaintiffs’ claimed, such activities were peaceful political speech. As such, the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ challenges to the lawfulness of the June 25 Electioneering Regulations. With respect to the provisions of the June 25 Use Policy (other than the age restriction, permitting process and criminal penalty), the court upheld the defendants’ grounds to govern use of County property and therefore granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining constitutional and Texas Election Code challenges and on plaintiffs’ claim that defendants acted outside of their authority.
With some issues remaining unresolved, the parties entered into extensive settlement negotiations. Throughout 2020 and the beginning of 2021, multiple status conferences were held and the parties continued negotiations with respect to revisions to the various policies. On April 15, 2021, the parties advised the court that all matters in dispute had been fully and finally settled and that the Starr County Commissioners Court had adopted new electioneering and use policies pursuant to an executed settlement agreement. The court ordered the parties to file appropriate dismissal documents by May 13, 2021.
On May 12, 2021, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal without prejudice.
This case was dismissed on May 13, 2021.
Summary Authors
Kristen Tassone (5/11/2024)
People
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6313081/parties/garza-v-starr-county/
Crane, Randy (Texas)
Alvarez, Jaime (Texas)
Alvarez, Jesus Maria (Texas)
Avila, Alejandra (Texas)
Fonseca, Ysmael D. (Texas)
Documents in the Clearinghouse
Docket
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6313081/garza-v-starr-county/
Last updated April 13, 2026, 4:34 a.m.
Case Details
State / Territory:
Case Type(s):
Special Collection(s):
Law Firm Antiracism Alliance (LFAA) project
Key Dates
Filing Date: Feb. 21, 2018
Closing Date: May 12, 2021
Case Ongoing: No
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
Politically active registered voters in the County
Plaintiff Type(s):
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
County
Starr County, Texas
Defendant Type(s):
Facility Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Constitutional Clause(s):
Other Dockets:
Southern District of Texas 7:18-cv-00046
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff OR Mixed
Relief Granted:
Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement
Source of Relief:
Form of Settlement:
Content of Injunction:
Order Duration: 2018 - 2021
Issues
Voting:
Case Summary of Garza v. Vera, Civil Rights Litig. Clearinghouse, http://www.dev.clearinghouse.net/case/44836/ (last updated 5/11/2024).