Case: Gregorio T v. Pete Wilson
2:94-cv-07652 | U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
Filed Date: Nov. 10, 1994
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Case Summary
On November 10, 1994, the plaintiff — a private individual, represented by the ACLU Foundation for Southern California— filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the governor of California, the Attorney General, and other state officials challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 187. Proposition 187 was a ballot initiative, as part of the November 1994 general election. It was passed by a vote of 59% to 41% and became effective the following day. The purpose of Proposition 187 was to provide for local, state, and federal cooperation in establishing a system to prevent undocumented immigrants from receiving public benefits or public services in California. Specifically, Proposition 187 required personnel working in law enforcement, social services, health care and public to verify the immigration statuses of people who they came into contact with; report those individuals to state and federal officials; and deny them social services, health care, and education.
The Proposition itself consisted of ten sections: a preamble (section 1), eight substantive sections (sections 2–9), and a section allowing the initiative to be severed (section 10). With regard to the substantive sections: sections 2 and 3 were related to the enforcement of crimes regarding the manufacture, distribution, sale or use of false citizenship or immigration papers; section 4 controlled the cooperation of law enforcement with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); sections 5 and 6 denied undocumented immigrants public social services and publicly funded healthcare; section 7 denied public primary and secondary education; section 8 denied public postsecondary education; and section 9 controlled the Attorney General’s cooperation with the INS.
The plaintiff’s complaint was one of five that challenged the Proposition’s constitutionality: League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Wilson, Case No. CV 94–7569 (a proposed class action), Children Who Want an Education v. Wilson, Case No. CV 94–7570, Ayala v. Pete B. Wilson, Case No. CV 94–7571, and Carlos P. v. Wilson, Case No. CV 95–0187. The cases were consolidated for purposes of motions, hearings, petitions and trial. The consolidated actions brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief contending that Proposition 187 was unconstitutional based on the Supremacy Clause, for the Proposition was preempted by the federal government's exclusive constitutional authority over the regulation of immigration as well as Congress' exercise of that power through the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) among other federal statutes. The consolidated cases were assigned to Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer.
On November 16, 1994, the Court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the Proposition. On December 14, 1995, the Court granted plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction, enjoining the implementation and enforcement of the Proposition, notwithstanding Sections 2 and 3. The defendants soon appealed the preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On May 4, 1995, the Ninth Circuit decided to consolidate and expedite the appeals for consideration. 54 F.3d 599. On July 14, 1995, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order, finding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. 59 F.3d 1002.
In the midst of the appeal, on May 1, 1995, plaintiffs Gregorio T and LULAC filed motions for summary judgment, contending preemption of the entire act. On November 20, 1995, the District Court granted and denied in part the motions for summary judgment. Determining that the federal government possesses the exclusive power to regulate immigration, the Court struck down some, but not all provisions of the Proposition. The court found that California was powerless to enact its own scheme to regulate immigration that ran parallel to or supplemented federal immigration laws. 908 F.Supp. 755.
The District Court upheld section 2 and 3 since they were not preempted—criminalizing certain conduct was a legitimate exercise of the state’s police powers. The Court determined that the sole stated purpose and effect of section 4 was to impermissibly regulate immigration, and thus was entirely preempted. As for section 5 and 6, the Court found that an inadequate showing was made so as to permit the Court to resolve the issue of whether the provisions are wholly preempted or whether they are preempted only to a limited extent. As such, the Court denied the plaintiffs’ request to strike down the provisions on preemption grounds. The Court further found that section 7 was preempted because the denial of primary and secondary education conflicted with federal law (Plyler v. Doe). However, no conflicts existed with regard to section 8, and so it was upheld. Finally, the Court found section 9 to be preempted because it had no purpose except to further the Proposition’s impermissible immigration regulation scheme. 908 F.Supp. 755.
On August 22, 1996, the federal government passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRA). The PRA created a comprehensive statutory scheme for determining immigrants’ eligibility for federal, state and local benefits and services.
On January 10, 1997, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's November 20, 1995 ruling, relying on the PRA. The defendants asked the Court to reconsider the “reporting and cooperation” provisions within sections 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 because the PRA allegedly permitted cooperation between state and local government entities and the INS. The Court denied the motion on March 3, 1997.
On March 3, 1997, the defendants filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to sections 2 and 3. The Court granted the motion as to section 2 and denied it with respect to section 3.
The District Court then issued a memorandum of law on November 14, 1997 with regard to remaining issues in the consolidated cases, specifically considering the enactment of the PRA and the remaining provisions that were not preempted by the Court in its November 1995 summary judgment decision. The Court held that California did not have the power to enact its own scheme to regulate immigration or limit access to public benefits, for those were powers exclusive to federal government. The enactment of the PRA reinforced the Court's conclusion that substantially all of the provisions of Proposition 187 are preempted, leaving only sections, 2, 3, and 10 to be upheld. 997 F.Supp. 1244.
Specifically, the District Court determined that the PRA preempted section 5 and 6 of the Proposition, for the PRA. Because the PRA is a regulatory scheme that restricted eligibility for all public benefits, the state of California had no power to legislate in that area. The Court determined that the only regulations that California can promulgate are those which implement the PRA due to Congress’s intent to “occupy the field of regulation of government benefits to” undocumented immigrants. Sections 5 and 6 thus were deemed unenforceable. Due to the Proposition no longer containing operable provisions relating to section 1’s declarations by the people of California to require cooperation between state and federal government in denying benefits and services to undocumented immigrants, the Court determined section 1 was not separately enforceable, and thus was not upheld. 997 F.Supp. 1244.
In its November 14 memorandum of law, the District Court reconsidered the motion for partial summary judgment with regard to sections 2 and 3, finding that the motion should have also been granted as to section 3, for it was not preempted. Because sections 2 and 3 of the Proposition were the only sections that remained operable, the Court determined that section 10, which allows for amendments and severability, to continue to be enforceable as well. 997 F.Supp. 1244.
On November 26, 1997, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendants’ petition to appeal the District Court’s order. On March 13, 1998, the District Court put its November 14, 1997 memorandum into a final order. It declared that sections 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of Proposition 187 violated the Supremacy Clause, were preempted by federal law, and had no force or effect. The Court permanently enjoined the State of California from implementing and enforcing those provisions of the Proposition. 1998 WL 141325.
On July 15, 1998, Plaintiffs moved for attorney fees and expenses. On April 13, 2001, the court granted the motion in part, awarding a total of $2,935,967. The court also subsequently granted attorneys' fees of $102,295 to intervenor-plaintiffs.
The case is now considered closed.
Summary Authors
Kavitha Babu (4/15/2024)
Maddie Mitzner (1/30/2025)
People
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6164539/parties/gregorio-t-v-pete-wilson/
Andrade, Vibiana (California)
Argueta, Silvia (California)
Bacon, Roxana (California)
Becker, David Jonathan (California)
Birnbaum, David M (California)
Becker, David Jonathan (California)
Caballero, Miguel G (California)
Castellano, Carmela (California)
Foerstel, Jonathon P (California)
Garcia, Lawrence Blaine (California)
Garcia, Bonifacio Bonny (California)
Grossman, Kurtiss Lee (California)
Hernandez, Antonia (California)
Iwasaki, Bruce Gen (California)
Jauregui, Russell (California)
Kwan-Gett, Mei Lin (California)
Kwoh, Stewart Chih-Ming (California)
Lu, Christopher P (California)
Milner, Michele A. (California)
Mirell, Douglas E (California)
Peterson, Linda S (California)
Phillips, Carter G (California)
Rosenbaum, Mark D (California)
Rosenzweig, Stefan (California)
Saenz, Thomas Andrew (California)
Birnbaum, David M (California)
Cole, Donald Phillip (California)
Dyer, Christina L (California)
Frazier, Jessica K (California)
Gonzales, Jose Angel (California)
Helwick, Christine (California)
Holland, Charlton G (California)
McCormick, Janet G (California)
Morrison, John Gary (California)
Orozco, Francisco L (California)
Documents in the Clearinghouse
Resources
Docket
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6164539/gregorio-t-v-pete-wilson/
Last updated April 12, 2026, 4:38 a.m.
Case Details
State / Territory:
Case Type(s):
Public Benefits/Government Services
Key Dates
Filing Date: Nov. 10, 1994
Case Ongoing: Perhaps, but long-dormant
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
A private individual
Plaintiff Type(s):
Non-profit NON-religious organization
Attorney Organizations:
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: Yes
Class Action Outcome: Granted
Defendants
State
State of California
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Ex parte Young (federal or state officials)
Constitutional Clause(s):
Other Dockets:
Central District of California 2:94-cv-07652
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 95-55186
Central District of California 94-cv-07569
Central District of California 94-cv-07570
Central District of California 94-cv-07571
Central District of California 95-cv-00187
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 95-55188
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 95-55191
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 95-55192
Available Documents:
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff OR Mixed
Relief Granted:
Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement
Preliminary injunction / Temp. restraining order
Source of Relief:
Content of Injunction:
Amount Defendant Pays: $3,038,261.57
Issues
General/Misc.:
Immigration/Border:
Undocumented immigrants - rights and duties
Undocumented immigrants - state and local regulation
Case Summary of Gregorio T v. Pete Wilson, Civil Rights Litig. Clearinghouse, http://www.dev.clearinghouse.net/case/45341/ (last updated 1/30/2025).