Case: Catholic Charities of Jackson, Lenawee and Hillsdale Counties v. Whitmer
1:24-cv-00718 | U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan
Filed Date: July 12, 2024
Case Ongoing
Clearinghouse coding complete
Case Summary
This lawsuit challenged HB 4616, a Michigan statute enacted in 2024, which banned the practice of conversion therapy in Michigan, and HB 4617, which defined "conversion therapy." [Throughout this summary, references to "HB 4616" or "the statute" encompass, too, the relevant definitions in HB 2617.]
The lawsuit was filed by Catholic Charities of Jackson, Lenawee, and Hillsdale Counties, a Catholic nonprofit that provides individual, family, and marital therapy via masters-level therapists, and an individual therapist that offers treatments from a perspective faithful to Catholic teachings. On July 12, 2024, they brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the Governor, Attorney General, Director of Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs and the Director of the Bureau of Professional Licensing within that Department, the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, and the members of the Michigan Board of Counseling, Michigan Board of Social Workers, and Michigan Board of Psychology. They sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion under the First Amendment and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that HB 4616 was unlawful on its face and as applied to them, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the law or otherwise penalizing plaintiffs for counseling on matters of sexual orientation and gender identity, damages, fees, and costs. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Jane M. Beckering.
Plaintiffs alleged violations of freedom of speech in several ways. First, that HB 4616 constituted unlawful content discrimination, because it prohibited speech based on communicative content, namely, by prohibiting therapy that communicated with a client in a way that sought to “change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity," though talk therapy that communicated with a client in other ways was permitted. They further asserted that the law was an impermissible viewpoint-based restriction on speech because it prohibited speech expressing a particular viewpoint on gender identity, sexual orientation, and human sexuality; they explained that speech supporting or affirming an individual's desire to undergo gender transition was permitted, while "speech that supports and affirms an individual’s desire to embrace her biological sex is forbidden." Moreover, they alleged that HB 4616 compelled speech by requiring counselors to speak to clients on the premise that seeking to align gender identity with biological sex, or seeking refrain from acting on same sex sexual attraction, would be harmful and not possible or desirable, regardless of the client's goals or religious beliefs, and by compelling speech affirming social and medical transition away from biological sex. The law could not pass constitutional muster, the plaintiffs urged, because, contrary to the purported government interest underlying it, it harmed rather than protected children, and the government had numerous, less-restrictive alternatives available to achieve its alleged interests. Plaintiffs further asserted that the law was an unreasonable restriction on speech because it lacked objective, workable standards, and that it unlawfully prohibited their clients from receiving talk therapy that helped them pursue their own personal goals, violating the clients' "right to hear speech that they actively desire to hear." As to the free exercise of religion, the plaintiffs alleged that they were engaged in religious exercise when providing counseling, including counseling that helped clients live consistently with their own religious beliefs on matters of gender identity and sexuality, and that HB 4616 therefore unlawfully burdened their religious exercise, apparently based on hostility to religion and hostility to a religious viewpoint. They further asserted that by prohibiting counseling that would help parents transmit their religious beliefs regarding sex and gender to their children, the law impermissibly interfered with parents’ right to direct the religious upbringing of their children. Finally, plaintiffs asserted due process violations grounded in "void for vagueness," alleging that HB 4616 was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to provide fair notice of what conduct is prohibited, offered no no objective basis for distinguishing between prohibited and permissible conduct and terms, and invited arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
On July 19, 2024, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, asking the court to enjoin the defendants from enforcing HB 4616 and HB 4617 against them or otherwise penalizing them for counseling clients on matters of gender identity or sexual orientation. The district court denied the motion for preliminary relief on January 28, 2025. 764 F.Supp.3d 623. Judge Beckering held, first, that the plaintiffs had standing to bring this lawsuit, citing their intended conduct, plausibly proscribed by the challenged statute, and a credible threat of enforcement. Next, analyzing the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on their free speech claims, she noted the broad power of states to regulate professional conduct and concluded that the challenged statute regulated conduct (administration of conversion treatment), not speech, and was subject to rational basis review; under this standard, in light of the state's interest in safeguarding the wellbeing of minors, the law was likely to pass constitutional muster. As to plaintiffs' free exercise claims, the district court preliminarily concluded that the law was facially neutral and generally applicable, and therefore that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their challenge. Similarly, the district court concluded that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their due process clause claim, reasoning, preliminarily, that law was not vague; "a counselor with 'change' as her predetermined treatment goal is the dividing line between exploring issues of sexuality or gender with a minor client and running afoul of Michigan's new law." Accordingly, the court denied preliminary relief.
Plaintiffs filed notice of interlocutory appeal on January 30, 2025, appealing the denial of preliminary injunctive relief to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Docket # 25-1105). On February 4, 2025, the district court granted the defendants' motion to hold the matter in abeyance pending appeal, staying and administratively closing the case.
On September 8, 2025, the appellate court denied the parties' joint motion to hold the case in abeyance pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Chiles v. Salazar, which addressed the constitutionality of a Colorado law similarly banning conversion therapy. The appellate court held argument on October 23, 2025, and, on December 17, 2025, issued a decision reversing the district court and remanding for prompt entry of a preliminary injunction. 2025 WL 3653774. The appellate court (Judges Kethledge and Larsen, with Judge Bloomekatz dissenting) first held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring this action, because they (1) intended to engage in speech arguably protected by the First Amendment; (2) that speech was arguably "if not plainly" proscribed by HB 4616; and (3) citing chilled speech and the State's failure to disavow future enforcement, that they faced a credible threat of enforcement. Turning to the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, the court first concluded that HB 4616 discriminated based on viewpoint, forbidding speech that "seeks to change" a child's sexual orientation or gender identity, even at the child's request, but expressly permitting counseling supporting a transition away from one's biological sex (and, in reverse, for sexual orientation), therefore codifying "a particular viewpoint[, that] sexual orientation is immutable, but gender is not." The court distinguished between regulation of non-expressive professional conduct, such as hospital sanitation, and expressive professional conduct, such as, as here, discussions expressing ideas. And it rejected the district court's determination that the law regulated conduct and not speech, explaining that where, as here, the putative conduct consists of communicating a message, and where the particular content of the message triggers (or not) application of the statute, it is treated as a restriction on speech. The court thus held that HB 4616 was a content- and viewpoint-based restriction on speech subject to the strictest of scrutiny under the First Amendment, and that the defendants had "not come close" to showing that the law was the "least restrictive means" possible of achieving their purported interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of minors. Therefore, finding "near-certain violation of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights" determinative of entitlement to injunctive relief, the appellate court reversed denial of the motion for preliminary relief and remanded to the district court for prompt entry of a preliminary injunction consistent with its opinion. In dissent, Judge Bloomekatz reasoned psychotherapy, an evidence-based medical intervention provided by trained professionals, falls within the state's historic power to regulate medicine, and questioned the Sixth Circuit's decision to issue this opinion without waiting for the U.S. Supreme Court's resolution of Chiles.
This case remains ongoing.
Summary Authors
Clearinghouse (12/21/2025)
People
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/68940084/parties/catholic-charities-of-jackson-lenawee-and-hillsdale-counties-v-whitmer/
Allen, Christopher M. (Michigan)
Braverman, Christopher W. (Michigan)
Amunson, Jessica Ring
Barday, Shireen
Brooks, Brennan Tyler (Michigan)
Documents in the Clearinghouse
Docket
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/68940084/catholic-charities-of-jackson-lenawee-and-hillsdale-counties-v-whitmer/
Last updated March 26, 2026, 9:07 p.m.
Case Details
State / Territory:
Case Type(s):
Key Dates
Filing Date: July 12, 2024
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
Catholic Charities of Jackson, Lenawee and Hillsdale Counties is a Catholic Michigan nonprofit that provides individual, family, and marital therapy. Emily McJones, MA, LLP, is a licensed therapist operating in Lansing, MI. She started her own practice, Little Flower Counseling, in 2020 and provides evidenced-based treatments from a perspective that is faithful to the teachings of the Catholic Church.
Plaintiff Type(s):
Non-profit religious organization
Public Interest Lawyer: No
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: No
Class Action Outcome: Not sought
Defendants
State
Michigan
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Constitutional Clause(s):
Other Dockets:
Western District of Michigan 1:24-cv-00718
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 25-01105
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff OR Mixed
Relief Sought:
Relief Granted:
Preliminary injunction / Temp. restraining order
Source of Relief:
Content of Injunction:
Issues
General/Misc.:
Discrimination Basis:
Affected Religion(s):
LGBTQ+:
Medical/Mental Health Care:
Case Summary of Catholic Charities of Jackson, Lenawee and Hillsdale Counties v. Whitmer, Civil Rights Litig. Clearinghouse, http://www.dev.clearinghouse.net/case/45991/ (last updated 12/21/2025).